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Abstract 
This study analyzes the impact of works councils on discrepancies between the preferred and 
actual working hours of employees. The results show that workers in codetermined 
establishments are more likely to match their working time preferences. This positive effect is 
due to a reduction of overemployment. However, the presence of works councils can also 
slightly increase the probability of employees working less than they would prefer. All effects 
are stronger for parents, especially for mothers, which confirms that works councils care for the 
compatibility of work and family life. Finally, the positive impact of works councils on working 
hours constraints can be explained by a lower probability of parents working overtime. 
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1 Introduction 
The standard neoclassical models of labor supply tell us that only time endowment restricts the 
employee’s working hours. Thus, working hours constraints, i.e. working hours that do not 
conform to the desired working hours of an employee, should not exist persistently. This 
prediction, however, has been challenged both by theoretical arguments and by empirical 
evidence in recent years. Using German data, for example, Holst (2009) as well as Constant and 
Otterbach (2011) show that there is a persistent gap between actual working time and desired 
working time, where fewer working hours are more frequently desired with income adjusted 
accordingly. Furthermore, less than fifty percent of all employees are satisfied with their 
current amount of working hours. The aim of our study is to analyze how works councils affect 
the likelihood of the existence of working hours constraints. Such works councils are a major 
institution within the German system of industrial relations and bargain over the organization 
of working time in an establishment1. They represent the interests of the employees at 
establishment level and have information, consultation and codetermination rights on a 
number of issues. Working time regulations in general and decisions on overtime are 
codetermined. Another emphasis of their activities is the reconciliation of work and family life. 
Thus, working hours constraints are clearly an issue that works councils may try to avoid.  
The question as to why binding working hours constraints exist has been analyzed in a 
substantial number of studies2. Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2002) as well as Otterbach 
(2010), for example, use data from 21 countries and show that certain socio-economic 
characteristics explain the existence of a time mismatch. They identify income and agreed 
working time as major determinants of working hours constraints. Furthermore, family 
structures, especially the existence of children, influence the extent of desired hours and 
therefore a potential hours mismatch (Clarkberg and Moen 2001, Reynolds 2004, Tseng and 
Wooden 2005, Holst 2007). Theoretical arguments provide no reliable explanation for working 
hours constraints. Different theoretical approaches such as principal-agent issues and firm-
specific human capital (Kahn and Lang 1992) as well as implicit contracts (Kahn and Lang 1995) 
are at most weakly supported empirically. Job insecurity, in contrast, seems to have a positive 
influence on the likelihood of overemployment (Stewart and Swaffield 1997).  
                                                          
1 Since the 1980s a considerable number of studies on the effects of works councils have been published. Frege 
(2002), Addison, Schnabel and Wagner (2004), and Jirjahn (2011) contain detailed surveys of this issue.  
2 See, for example, Otterbach (2010) for a survey of different studies on working hours constraints.  
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Compared to the determinants of working hours constraints, the consequences of such time 
mismatches have been analyzed less frequently. Empirical evidence shows that working time 
mismatch increases the probability of an employee changing their job within the company and 
in the worst case a constrained worker may even quit his or her job3. At the very least, such a 
job change destroys the job-specific human capital if the employee still works for the same 
employer. If the employee actually leaves the firm, the entire firm-specific human capital is lost.  
Besides such welfare-decreasing effects of working hours constraints, additional negative 
effects on employee wellbeing with respect to  job satisfaction and life satisfaction 
(Theodossiou and Zangelidis 2009, Wodden, Warren and Drago 2009, Grözinger, Matiaske and 
Tobsch 2008) as well as negative impact on health (Bell, Otterbach and Sousa-Poza 2011, 
Constant and Otterbach 2011, Grözinger, Matiaske and Tobsch 2008) have been identified. 
Wunder and Heineck (2012) find that not only an employee’s own wellbeing is negatively 
affected by a working time mismatch, but even life satisfaction of his or her partner. Finally if 
the mismatch between preferred working time and that which the employer requires is large, 
labor supply will not take place at all and this clearly affects welfare. 
If working hours constraints are such a big issue, the question arises as to how works councils 
can help to reduce such constraints. Ellguth and Promberger (2007) provide evidence for a 
strong influence of works councils on working time. They find that codetermined 
establishments have significantly lower agreed weekly working hours and also strongly differ in 
the usage of working time instruments such as overtime work and working time accounts. 
Besides a general influence on working time, works councils also have the objective to support 
the reconciliation of work and family life of the employees. In principle, such reconciliation 
means, among other things, that family life should not be (excessively) restricted by working 
time. Or in other words: works councils should prevent working time mismatches that 
negatively influence family life. As already mentioned above, family structures indeed influence 
time preferences and time mismatch. In particular the existence of children accounts for a 
major part of one’s time endowment. Hence, a time mismatch of a working parent might 
strongly generate disutility from work because, besides insufficient leisure time, difficulties in 
                                                          
3 See e.g. Antonji and Paxson (1992), Bijwaard, van Dijk and de Koning (2008), Böheim and Taylor (2004), Euwals 
(2001).  
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childcare provision could emerge. For traditional reasons, time mismatch could influence 
women’s behavior more strongly, and even prevent women from labor market participation.  
Family-friendly practices are indeed more frequently used in codetermined establishments than 
in establishments without works councils. Heywood and Jirjahn (2009) show, for example, that 
the existence of a works council increases the likelihood of an establishment offering support 
with respect to childcare, keeping in touch with the employee during parental leave and also 
taking into account specific needs regarding working time and the job design of parents. 
Moreover, Beblo and Wolf (2004) find that codetermined establishments more frequently 
implement measures that facilitate the compatibility of work and family life. We therefore 
focus especially on the effect of works councils on working time constraints of parents.  
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we show that employees of 
establishments with works councils more often match their desired working hours, mostly due 
to a strong reduction of the probability of overemployment for parents, especially for mothers. 
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the legal background of 
German codetermination rights and, based on relevant working time mismatch theories, the 
potential impact of works councils on the outcome. In the 3rd section, we describe our data, 
variables and our econometric models. Section 4 contains a discussion of our results. In Section 
5 we discuss how a works council’s influence on overtime can affect working hours mismatches. 
Finally, we conclude in Section 6.   
 
2 Legal background and Theoretical Thoughts 
The legal basis of the power of works councils is the German Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, WCA). It defines that workers in establishments with at least five 
employees are allowed to adopt a works council. Works councils have extensive 
codetermination rights regarding social and workplace-related issues in an establishment. 
Although collective bargaining agreements might constrain the influence of works councils on 
the quantity of working hours per week, agreements regarding working time are the main topic 
area of works councils (Hauser-Ditz, Hertwig and Pries 2008). Above all Section 87.1.2 of the 
WCA has a fundamental influence on the quality of the working day, namely on beginning and 
ending, breaks and the distribution of working time over the week. Moreover, Section 87.1.3 of 
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the WCA provides fundamental codetermination rights with respect to the use and amount of 
overtime work. Besides their influence on working time, works councils are also encouraged to 
facilitate reconciliation of work and family life (Section 80.1.2b of the WCA). On the one side 
works councils may contribute to a closer match of actual and preferred working time by 
agreements with the management on special arrangements regarding the working time of a 
parent. This takes into account the special requirements and duties of mothers and fathers. On 
the other hand works councils may bargain over childcare services provided internally or 
externally by the establishment. Such employer-sponsored childcare facilities most likely affect 
the preferred working time of a parent and as such helps to alleviate a mismatch with actual 
working time in an establishment. Both options increase the likelihood of an improved working 
time match. However not all establishments have a works council. In fact, only a minority do. 
This offers the opportunity to analyze possible differences between establishments with and 
without a works council concerning hours match and mismatch.  
Besides an adjustment through codetermination rights, German employees are also able to 
alter their working time according to the provisions on part-time employment of the Act on 
Part-Time Work and Fixed-Term Employment (Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz). The aim of this 
act is to support the realization of part-time work within an establishment. It allows every 
employee to reduce his or her working time as long as the change in working time does not 
unduly burden the employer. Although this act supports the possibility of an employee to 
reduce his or her working hours, a significant proportion of German employees are, as 
mentioned above, overemployed. Despite the fact that no direct link between this act and 
codetermination rights exists, works councils can still support the enforcement of the desired 
working time reduction of an employee. They could use their bargaining power and information 
rights in order to induce the management to comply with such a request that would otherwise 
not be accepted.  
The simplest theory on labor supply and hour determination assumes the absence of 
restrictions of any kind and therefore an optimal match according to the preference of the 
workers can be achieved. In practice employers frequently make a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer 
concerning working hours (Pencavel 1986, 41). Several theories exist as to why an employer 
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determines a specific number of hours and is not willing to negotiate about this4. However, we 
only discuss theories which might explain the influence of works councils on working hours 
constraints.  
Golden (1998) as well as Clarkberg and Moen (2001) regard the determination of actual 
working time as the result of three forces: workers’ preferences, employers’ demands and the 
institutional environment in which hours decisions are mediated. In this connection, 
institutional environment is determined by legal constraints such as labor law and regulation, 
collective bargaining processes, normative practices and the macroeconomic climate. The idea 
is that institutions are able to prevent exploitation of one side of the negotiators and direct the 
exchange towards a socially desired outcome. Works councils are explicitly involved in the 
process of working time determination. In addition works councils are encouraged to pursue 
social goals through their activities. This suggests that works councils try to reconcile the 
diverging preferences of employers and workers with regard to working hours. 
Landers at al. (1996) argue that employees are prepared to work more than desired in order to 
signal low disutility from work and therefore being a candidate for better paid positions within 
a firm. In principle, such overemployment is the result of the dynamic optimization of an 
employee in which disutility from the current time mismatch has to be compensated by the 
discounted additional future earnings that an overemployed worker expects. Addison, Teixeira 
and Zwick (2010) however, highlight that works councils increase the wage level but also 
compress the wage distribution in an establishment. Thus, gains from promotions are lower, 
reducing the willingness of employees to be currently overemployed.  
Another theoretical explanation for working time constraints is the job insecurity hypothesis. 
Steward and Sweffield (1997) argue that employers are able to increase working time without 
expecting quits if workers face a high risk of unemployment and the range of alternative jobs is 
scarce for macroeconomic reasons. Workers might accept overemployment rather than risk 
dismissal and unemployment. Works councils, however, have codetermination rights with 
respect to dismissals. Thus, they provide further protection from dismissal so that a working 
time mismatch caused by job insecurity should less frequently occur.  
                                                          
4 See, e.g., Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2002) for a discussion on the theoretical explanation of working hours 
constraints. 
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Freeman and Medoff (1984) and many others assert that unions act as an efficient channel to 
express dissatisfaction with working conditions. With regard to German industrial relations the 
body representing workers at establishment or firm level are works councils (FitzRoy and Kraft 
1984, 1987). In combination with the strong codetermination rights regarding working time 
regulation, they provide excellent opportunities to express the preferences of the employees 
and simultaneously to exert bargaining power concerning hours determination. 
Finally, the effect of works councils on working hours constraints can also be rationalized by 
public choice theory. The decision as to who becomes a works councilor is the result of an 
election process and these elections take place every 4 years. Workers interested in alternative 
working time rules will vote for candidates who promise to exert an influence in this direction. 
Thus the elected employees will represent the working time preferences of the majority of the 
voters. This however also means that some workers will probably be worse off, namely if their 
preferences strongly deviate from the working time preference of the majority.  
Similarly, the demand for family-friendly work policies probably reflects the preferences of the 
workforce and is of higher relevance if many parents work in an establishment. These parents 
then elect representatives who promise to commit to childcare.  
A match between preferred and actual working time and in particular the introduction of 
employer-sponsored childcare services will probably be positively valued by public opinion. 
They may be regarded by works councils as fringe benefits and bargaining for them may be part 
of a rent-maximization strategy (Heywood and Jirjahn 2009). 
 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
For the empirical analysis we use the waves 2001 to 2009 of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP) and construct an unbalanced panel of full-time private sector workers between the age 
of 20 and 605 (for further information on the data see Wagner et al., 2007). As works councils 
                                                          
5 We also used data that contained part-time employees. We were however unable to identify any significant 
effect of our independent variables on their working hours constraints. This might be explained by strong 
selectivity and heterogeneity in part-time work.  
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can be elected in establishments with at least five employees, we drop all observations of 
persons working in very small firms with four workers and less.6  
In the SOEP, information on the existence of a works council in an employee’s establishment is 
only available for the years 2001 and 2006. To increase sample size, we make the assumption 
that the works council status does not change in a firm over time7. For the period before/after 
2001 and 2006 in which employees do not change their job, we carry backward/forward the 
information on the existence of works councils. If workers stay in the same firm during 2001 
and 2006 and report that they are represented by a works council in one year but not in the 
other year, we exclude observations for all years for which we do not exactly know whether the 
works council already/still existed (i.e. we drop the observations for all years except for 2001 
and 2006). If workers switch jobs between 2001 and 2006, we use the works council 
information of the former employer up to the year of the job change and information of the 
new employer after the job change. If persons change job after 2006 or repeatedly between 
2001 and 2006, we drop all observations concerned.  
Our dependent variables are based on the difference between actual weekly working hours and 
preferred weekly working hours. The question about desired working hours in the 
questionnaire reads: “If you could choose your own number of working hours, taking into 
account that your income would change according to the number of hours: How many hours 
would you want to work?” Actual working hours are taken from the question “And how many 
hours do your actual working-hours consist of including possible over-time?“ If both numbers 
are the same, there is no working hours mismatch and workers do not face any binding 
constraints. If preferred hours are higher than actual hours persons are underemployed, and 
overemployed if they would like to work less than their actual working hours. 
After excluding all observations with missing information on the relevant variables, our sample 
consists of 4992 full-time employees and 16140 observations. Table A1 in the appendix 
presents the mean values of the variables we use in our estimations. It shows that there are 
                                                          
6 The data used in this study was extracted using the Add-On PanelWhiz for Stata®. PanelWhiz 
(http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew 
and Hahn (2010) for details. The PanelWhiz generated do-file to retrieve the data used here is available from us 
upon request. Any data or computational errors in this study are our own. 
7 Using the IAB-Establishment Panel, Addison, Schank, Schnabel and Wagner (2006) show that approx. 2 % of all 
establishments dissolved or adopted a works council within 2 years. Thus, we think that the effect of a 
measurement error in the existence of a works council can be neglected.  
9 
 
large discrepancies between preferred hours of work and actual hours of work. On average, 
people work 42.48 hours a week, which exceeds their average contractually-agreed working 
hours of 38.54. Average preferred weekly working hours would be 37.69, in other words 
preferred working hours would be even less than the agreed working hours. However, there 
are also people who would like to work more. 6.6% of all people in the sample are 
underemployed, but the majority of employees, 66.5%, are overemployed and would prefer to 
work less than they do. Only 26.9% of all workers meet their working hours preferences exactly.  
Regarding our main independent variable, namely a dummy for the existence of a works 
council, more than 60 per cent of all employees are represented by a works council in their 
establishment8. As we expect works councils to affect agreed and actual working hours 
(including potential overtime) in the interest of employees, we first descriptively analyze 
differences between firms with and without codetermination.  
The mean values of working hours and hours constraints in Table 1 show that there are 
significant differences between employees in firms with and without works councils.  
Agreed working hours are about one hour shorter in establishments with works councils, whilst 
actual working hours in firms without works councils exceed those in firms with works councils 
by as many as 1.309 hours. Thus, employees represented by works councils seem to work 
slightly less overtime. Works councils have strong decision rights with respect to overtime work 
and have to agree on its use or extension. We discuss the issue of overtime as a possible way of 
adjusting actual working hours to preferred working hours in Section 5. Also, preferred hours of 
work are lower in codetermined establishments but, at about only 24 minutes, the difference is 
much smaller. The share of people without working hours constraints is 2.5 percentage points 
larger in firms with works councils. This is caused by a significantly lower percentage of 
overemployed workers of 4.7 percentage points. With respect to underemployment, works 
councils do not seem to enable employees to extend their working hours if they wish to work 
more. Underemployment is even more frequently observed in establishments with works 
councils. If a person is strongly constrained because of family duties and domestic work, 
preferences concerning working time but also the possibility to realize preferred hours of work 
may differ. This should mainly be a problem for women, especially for those with children. 
                                                          
8 Although the majority of all establishments have no works council, those which have one are on average much 
larger and this explains the high percentage of workers represented by a works council.  
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Table 1 additionally shows the comparison of working hours for workers with and without a 
works council separately for men and women. Male workers who are represented by a works 
council are more likely to meet their working hours preferences, but again this is only caused by 
a lower probability of being overemployed.  
 
    Table 1: Working hours for employees with and without works councils 
 Works council No works council Difference 
All    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.111 39.226 -1.115*** 
Actual working hours (week) 41.985 43.294 -1.309*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 37.541 37.936 -0.394*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.279 0.254 0.025*** 
Overemployed 0.647 0.694 -0.047*** 
Underemployed 0.074 0.053 0.021*** 
Number of observations 6150 9990  
Women    
Agreed working hours (week) 37.983 38.789 -0.806*** 
Actual working hours (week) 41.221 41.853 -0.632*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 36.019 36.282 -0.263** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.257 0.243 0.014 
Overemployed 0.692 0.716 -0.023* 
Underemployed 0.051 0.041 0.009 
Number of observations 2179 2769  
Men    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.160 39.466 -1.306*** 
Actual working hours (week) 42.278 44.085 -1.807*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 38.125 38.843 -0.718*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.288 0.260 0.028*** 
Overemployed 0.630 0.681 -0.052*** 
Underemployed 0.083 0.059 0.024*** 
Number of observations 7221 3971  
 ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations.  
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With respect to underemployment, however, male employees in firms with works councils are 
even more often affected. For female employees the differences are less pronounced. All in all, 
women more often report facing working hours constraints. 25.1% of all female workers realize 
their preferred working hours compared to 27.8% of all male workers. Moreover, women are 
more frequently overemployed whereas men are more often underemployed.   
As mentioned above, children may also play an important role in the context of working hours 
constraints. Table 2 presents the differences in hours of work of women and men with and 
without children. In our sample 19.1% of all full-time employed women and 40.7% of all male 
workers have children up to age 16. 
 
Table 2: Working hours for employees with and without children 
 Children No children Difference 
Women    
Agreed working hours (week) 37.996 38.419 -0.423*** 
Actual working hours (week) 40.749 41.677 -0.927*** 
Preferred working hours (week) 35.832 36.207 -0.375*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.297 0.240 0.057*** 
Overemployed 0.649 0.715 -0.066*** 
Underemployed 0.054 0.045 0.009 
Number of observations 947 4001  
Men    
Agreed working hours (week) 38.574 38.657 -0.082** 
Actual working hours (week) 42.931 42.912 0.019 
Preferred working hours (week) 38.548 38.265 0.283*** 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.276 0.279 -0.002 
Overemployed 0.647 0.648 -0.001 
Underemployed 0.076 0.073 0.003 
Number of observations 4550 6642  
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations. 
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Full-time employed mothers work less than women without children and also prefer fewer 
hours. They are less often overemployed and less often affected by hours constraints. Thus, 
they seem to be frequently able to reconcile family and working life. It is possible that women 
with children are to a greater extent willing or more under pressure to advocate their working 
time preferences or employers are better prepared to adjust working hours to the needs of 
employee with family duties. However, mothers who find it difficult to adjust their full-time 
working hours to their demands may not work at all or prefer part-time jobs, so this result may 
be driven by selectivity. In contrast to women, male employees with children have higher 
preferred working hours compared to men without children, maybe due to their role as 
breadwinner. As full-time working mothers on average seem to be more satisfied with their 
hours of work compared to women without children, the question arises as to whether works 
councils can especially help to assert working time preferences of employees with children 
against the employer. 
Table 3 reports the differences between full-time employed parents with and without works 
councils.  
 
Table 3: Working hours constraints for employees with children  
and with/without works councils 
 Works council No works council Difference 
Women    
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.329 0.255 0.074*** 
Overemployed 0.607 0.704 -0.096*** 
Underemployed 0.064 0.041 0.022 
Number of observations 535 412  
Men    
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours)  
(dummy) 
0.292 0.244 0.048*** 
Overemployed 0.617 0.705 -0.087*** 
Underemployed 0.089 0.050 0.039*** 
Number of observations 3023 1527  
 ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009 own calculations. 
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For mothers works councils seem to have strong positive effects on their chances of obtaining 
optimal working hours. The likelihood of being overemployed is 9.6 percentage points lower for 
mothers working in firms with works councils. For male employees with children the probability 
of working more than intended is also much lower in establishments with works councils, 
although they have a somewhat higher likelihood of being underemployed of 3.9 percentage 
points. 
 
4 Econometric Method and Results 
In line with previous studies (see e.g. Reynolds 2004, Tseng and Wooden 2005), we do not take 
into account the absolute difference between preferred and actual hours but only analyze 
which factors determine the probability of overemployment or underemployment. Thus, our 
dependent variable has three unordered categories9. Workers have either no hours constraint, 
are underemployed or are overemployed. First we estimate multinomial logit models with “no 
hours constraint” as base category. We use two different specifications. The first one includes a 
dummy for the existence of a works council whereas the second model additionally considers a 
works council’s effect on hours constraints for employees with children by an interaction 
variable. As in the case of the descriptive analysis we also estimate all models separately for 
men and women. We take into account a set of socio-demographic and job-specific control 
variables (see also full estimation results in Tables A2 to A4 in the Appendix). We control for 
gender, age and marital status by including age in years and its squared value as well as 
dummies for women, married persons and for having at least one child up to age 16.  
Additionally, we add a dummy variable which equals one if a person lives in East Germany, two 
dummies for highest educational achievement (completed vocational training and holding a 
university degree) and a variable indicating monthly household income less own monthly wage 
(i.e. wage of the partner and other income if applicable). With regard to job and firm 
characteristics we include tenure in years, agreed weekly working hours, hourly wage, firm size 
dummies and industry dummies as well as dummies for blue and white collar workers 
differentiated by qualification level.  
                                                          
9 Some studies treat this variable as being ordered. In our opinion it is not. Being, for example, underemployed is 
not a lower category than being overemployed. It is in fact a completely different labor market status that is a 
result of a bad match which is simply not comparable to another kind of bad match, namely being overemployed. 
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As mentioned before, persons with strong (expected) hours constraints might even choose to 
quit their job or to remain outside the labor market. If the samples of employed persons and 
persons not working are systematically different and factors affecting selection into the sample 
simultaneously affect the outcome of interest, our results could be biased. Unfortunately, to 
our knowledge, no selection models with multinomial outcomes in the second stage exist. 
However, we can estimate binary probit models with sample selection. As a robustness test we 
therefore also consider sample selection but this is only possible if we neglect the fact that 
employees can work more or less than they would prefer. We just differentiate between 
workers with and without hours constraints. As selection into the labor market is very different 
for women and men, we only estimate separate models and do not use the full sample10. In 
addition to the 11192 observations of male and 4948 of female full-time employees we include 
5330 observations of men and 10289 of women who are unemployed or inactive.11 Based on 
the two resulting larger subsamples of men and women we apply a probit sample selection 
model (Heckman probit model) introduced by Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981). This model is a 
modification of the well-known Heckman sample selection model (1979) for continuous 
outcomes. The latent equation is 
    *i i 1iy x uβ= +        (1) 
such that the binary outcome (which equals one if a person’s working hours exactly match her 
or his preferred hours of work)  
    *i i i 1iy (y x u 0)β= = + >       (2) 
is observed. However, the dependent variable is not always observed but only if 
    selecti i 2iy (z u 0)γ= + >       (3) 
with     
    
1
2
1 2
u N(0,1)
u N(0,1)
corr(u ,u ) .=


ρ
 
 
The selection equation is identified by adding several variables excluded in the estimation of 
having no hours constraints. We mainly use household and partner information as a dummy for 
                                                          
10 For example, married women more often choose to stay at home, which is not the case for married men. The 
same is true for female and male workers with children. 
11 The share of persons participating in the labor market is quite low. However, note that we excluded all public 
sector employees. 
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being married and weekly working hours of the spouse (and a set of interaction variables), as 
these variables are insignificant in the multinomial logit model and thus do not explain hours 
constraints and underemployment or overemployment.  
Although we are able to consider sample selection with this approach, the main disadvantage is 
that we lose some information as we cannot differentiate between overemployment and 
underemployment. The model only considers match and mismatch.  Thus, we will concentrate 
on discussing the multinomial logit results and afterwards briefly present the Heckman probit 
results as a robustness check. 
Table 4 shows the marginal effects of works councils on the probability of being overemployed 
or underemployed. As mentioned above, we estimate two different models. In the second one 
and in contrast to the first one, we differentiate between the effects of works councils on 
employees with and without children.  
The results mainly confirm our findings based on the descriptive statistics. In the full sample 
employees whose interests are represented by a works council have a probability 2.3 
percentage points higher of achieving their desired hours. This is due to the fact that they are 
less often overemployed. Works councils reduce the probability of working more hours than 
preferred by 3.2 percentage points. Model 2 differentiates between employees with and 
without children up to 16. The positive (reducing) effects of works councils on overemployment 
but also the negative effects on underemployment are more pronounced for people with 
children. Thus, they ensure that a larger share of workers meet their preferences, but this is at 
the expense of those who would like to work more. However, the reduction of the share of 
overemployed workers in the presence of a works council is larger than the increased share of 
workers who cannot realize their preferences for more work.  Overall, the probability of exactly 
meeting working time preferences for employees with children is 5.5 percentage points higher 
if they work in a firm with a works council. 
In the next step we estimate both models separately for women and men. The marginal effects 
of Model 1 show, in contrast to the descriptive results, that all works council effects (both the 
positive and negative ones) are more pronounced for women. Women working in a 
codetermined establishment are 3.6 percentage points more likely to face no hours constraints, 
however the effect is insignificant. Moreover, they are 6.0 percentage points less likely to be 
overemployed compared to female employees in firms without works councils but they also 
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have a 2.3 percentage points higher probability of working less than they would like to.  For 
men all effects are insignificant.    
 
Table 4: Marginal effects on working hours mismatch - multinomial logit models 
   Difference in predicted outcome 
  Effect of works 
councils at … Desired = Actual Desired < Actual Desired > Actual 
Fu
ll 
sa
m
pl
e 
N
=1
61
40
 Model 1 No differentiation 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
-0.032** 
(0.014) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.008* 
(0.016) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
Kids=1 0.055*** (0.018) 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
0.026** 
(0.011) 
Fe
m
al
e 
N
=4
94
8 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.036 (0.022) 
-0.060** 
(0.025) 
0.023** 
(0.011) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.041 
(0.026) 
0.019 
(0.012) 
Kids=1 0.097** (0.041) 
-0.137*** 
(0.043) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
M
al
e 
N
=1
11
92
 Model 1 No differentiation 
0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.020) 
-0.009 
(0.011) 
Kids=1 0.040** (0.020) 
-0.058*** 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.013) 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Included 
control variables see Tables A2 to A4 in the Appendix. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations. 
 
When we differentiate between women and men with and without children, the effects of 
works councils for both women and men without children up to 16 are weak and insignificant. 
For men and women with children marginal effects of works councils are mostly significant and 
quite strong, especially for mothers, and similar but weaker for fathers. Female employees with 
children have a higher probability of 9.7 percentage points of exactly meeting their working 
time preferences compared to mothers working in firms without works councils. This is caused 
by a large reduction in the probability of being overemployed of 13.7 percentage points. These 
findings are consistent with the hypothesis that works councils support or even initiate the 
introduction of family-friendly work practices or corporate childcare. Moreover, works councils 
could be an efficient institution to help to communicate workers’ preferences to the employer. 
However, the likelihood of underemployment is slightly higher for mothers working in 
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establishments with works councils. Apparently establishments with works councils show a 
tendency towards “normal” working time.  
As mentioned above, selection effects into employment could bias our results on working hours 
constraints. Thus, we additionally estimate Heckman probit models which allow us to control 
for selection effects. Selection into employment should be more pronounced for women, 
especially for those who are married and/or have children, as traditionally in Germany, they still 
tend to be responsible for housework and family duties whereas in many families men are still 
the breadwinners. Hence, faced with the decision to work or to stay at home, wives and 
mothers who decide to participate in the labor market may have special characteristics which 
could also have an impact on their perception of optimal working hours. 
As some factors, for example being married, can have very different effects for men and 
women on their likelihood to work, and as selection into employment is a more important issue 
for women, we only run separate estimations for men and women and do not use the full 
sample. As mentioned above, we cannot differentiate between overemployment and 
underemployment. We only estimate the effect of works councils on the probability of facing 
no hours constraints in this selection model. Table 4 shows that works councils have two 
opposing effects on the probability of exactly matching working time preferences. On the one 
hand, they reduce the probability of overemployment, on the other hand they increase the 
likelihood of underemployment. However, the first effect is much more pronounced than the 
second and we also find an overall positive effect of works councils on the probability of 
working preferred hours. The estimated marginal effects of the probit models with selection 
are comparable to those for the first category (desired hours = actual hours) of the multinomial 
logit models.   
The complete estimation results of the selection equation and the second stage equation can 
be found in Table A5 in the Appendix. The results indicate that selection effects are only 
present for women. The marginal effects for works council existence of the second stage 
equation (with the binary dependent variable indicating a perfect match between actual and 
preferred hours) are reported in Table 5. Again, we estimate two models where we 
differentiate between men and women with and without children in Model 2. 
Selection does not seem to severely bias our results presented above, as the effects shown in 
Table 5 are similar to those obtained in the multinomial logit models without controlling for 
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potential selection bias. As an additional robustness test we also estimated an IV probit model 
where we treated the wage as endogenous and, for this purpose, instrumented the wage 
through several industry dummies. A Wald test, however, always rejected correlation between 
the error term of the reduced equation and the structural equation. Hence, we could not reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no endogeneity. Thus, we refrain from showing these results in 
this paper because they do not lead to contradicting estimates, in contrast  to our previous 
results. Finally, we also changed the definition of our dependent variables as an additional 
robustness check. We changed the definition of being not constrained from a perfect working 
time match to a match that treats a deviation of up to 75 min per week (i.e. an average 
deviation of 15 min per day) from the preferred working hours as still being not constrained. 
This wider definition does not change our results.  
 
     Table 5: Marginal effects working hours mismatch 
  - Heckman probit models 
  Effect of works 
councils at … 
Absolute change in prob. of 
desired hours = actual hours 
Fe
m
al
e 
N
=1
52
37
 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.040* (0.024) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.023 
(0.024) 
Kids=1 0.113** (0.044) 
M
al
e 
N
=1
65
22
 
Model 1 No differentiation 0.019 (0.015) 
Model 2 
Kids=0 
0.002 
(0.018) 
Kids=1 0.044** (0.020) 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Included control variables and selection equation see Table A5 in the 
Appendix. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations. 
 
5 The Role of Preferences and Overtime  
Our previous results show that the likelihood of a perfect working time match increases if a 
works council exists in an establishment. This result is driven by a strong increase in the 
probability of observing a perfect match if people have children. In the following, we try to 
identify the source of the increase in this likelihood by analyzing the effect of works councils on 
preferred working hours and overtime. On the one hand, works councils may change preferred 
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working hours. Works councils have to bargain about the beginning, breaks and the end of a 
work day. If they are able to enforce daily working time regulations that are more in line with 
the preferences of the employees, staff will presumably be prepared to work more hours per 
week. Thus, employees in codetermined establishments may desire to work more and then 
preferred working time would be closer to actual working time. In this case, the lower 
likelihood of overemployment could be explained by an increase in the desired working time. 
Hence, we estimate the impact of works councils on preferred working time. On the other 
hand, works council-induced constraints on the use of overtime might increase the likelihood of 
a perfect working time match. As already mentioned, whilst overtime can be an important 
source of working time mismatch, it may be strongly influenced by works councils12. We 
estimate a probit model where the dependent variable has unit value if the employee works 
overtime. Again, we use two models, one without and one with differentiation between 
employees with and without children13. The upper part of Table 6 shows the results of OLS 
estimates of the effects of the works council on preferred working time. The lower part 
contains the results of a probit model with a dummy for overtime working as dependent 
variable14.  
We find no effects of works councils on preferred working time, regardless of whether the 
observed person is a parent or not. Thus we expect that our results are rather driven by 
particular overtime effects of parents in codetermined establishments. The results for Model 2 
in the probit equation indicate that parents in codetermined establishments work overtime 
significantly less often. The probability of not working overtime is 4.0 percentage points higher 
for parents represented by a works council. Thus, works councils reduce their actual working 
hours. For employees without children up to age 16 we find no significant reduction in the 
likelihood of overtime work. Hence, for this group works councils do not prevent overtime 
work. 
 
                                                          
12 Hübler and Meyer (1997), Kölling (1997), Schank and Schnabel (2004) as well as Jirjahn (2008) analyze the impact 
of work councils on overtime and find no or at most negligible effects. In contrast to our study, they use 
establishment data. Kraft and Lang (2008) use the SOEP and also estimate the effects of works councils. They, 
however, concentrate on the effect of works councils on the magnitude of overtime work after a works council has 
been adopted. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) use the SOEP and estimate a model that is quite similar to our 
approach. They, however, do not control for the existence of a works council.  
13 Note that we lose 6 observations due to missing values in the dependent variable “overtime”. 
14 Note that we do not separate our sample into male and female observations because our previous results show 
that both groups are similarly affected by works councils.    
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Table 6: Marginal effects of works councils on preferred 
working hours and on the incidence of overtime  
 
***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
Standard errors in parentheses. Included control variables see Tables 
A6 and A7 in the Appendix. 
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations. 
 
6 Conclusion 
Although a large proportion of workers face working hours constraints that can strongly affect 
job satisfaction and health, the effect of labor market institutions on such constraints has 
largely been neglected in the previous literature. We analyze how worker representation on the 
establishment level by works councils affect the likelihood of being underemployed, 
overemployed or employed according to one’s preferences. We find that works councils indeed 
increase the likelihood of matching employees’ working time preferences by mainly reducing 
the likelihood of overemployment. However, we also find a small increase in the likelihood of 
underemployment. Additionally, our results show that parents even more frequently match 
their preferred working time which can be explained by a fundamental task of works councils, 
namely the reconciliation of family and working life.  
Moreover, our results on overtime show that the somewhat reduced probability of the 
occurrence parents of working overtime can be a driving force for lower overemployment in 
codetermined establishments. 
Hence worker codetermination affects more areas than the more commonly investigated topics 
such as productivity, profits, wages, turnover and innovation. Employees will most likely very 
much appreciate cooperative solutions to problems connected with differences between their 
Preferred working hours – Pooled OLS 
Model 1 
N=16140 No differentiation 
-0.013 
(0.127) 
Model 2 
N=16140 
Kids=0 
-0.130 
(0.144) 
Kids=1 0.227 (0.169) 
Incidence of overtime - Probit 
Model 1 
N=16134 No differentiation 
-0.018 
(0.012) 
Model 2 
N=16134 
Kids=0 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Kids=1 -0.040** (0.019) 
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working time preferences and the expectations of the employers. In turn labor supply may 
react to the employee-orientated determination of working conditions. Given the increasing 
contribution of married women to labor supply and the growing importance of reconciling 
family life and work against the background of demographic problems faced by most developed 
economies, our results are probably not insignificant.  
Our results imply some questions for future research.  If works councils reduce the likelihood of 
constrained working hours, which consequences will arise for the employer? Does a greater 
flexibility of agreements on working time towards employees’ preferences in contrast restrict 
the power to determine working hours from the employer’s view? Does this increase 
production costs and therefore imply a redistribution from the employer to the workers? Or is 
the reduction of working hours constraints rather a result of a coordination process that 
enhances efficiency by simply reducing information asymmetries between employers’ and 
employees’ preferences? While in the first case clearly no Pareto improvement is realized, the 
latter indeed increases welfare. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Mean values of used variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 
Agreed working hours (week) 38.536 2.054 
Actual working hours (week) 42.484 5.256 
Preferred working hours (week) 37.692 3.996 
No hours constraint (preferred=actual hours) (dummy) 0.269 0.444 
Overemployed (preferred<actual hours) (dummy) 0.665 0.472 
Underemployed (preferred>actual hours) (dummy) 0.066 0.248 
Hourly wage (€) 16.611 7.679 
Tenure 11.470 9.139 
Firm size: 5-19 workers  (dummy) 0.163 0.369 
Firm size: 20-99 workers (dummy) 0.218 0.413 
Firm size: 100-199 workers (dummy) 0.109 0.311 
Firm size: 200-1999 workers (dummy) 0.261 0.439 
Firm size: 2000 workers and more (dummy) 0.249 0.433 
Works council (dummy) 0.619 0.486 
Female (dummy) 0.307 0.461 
Age  41.219 9.621 
Highest educational degree: University degree (dummy) 0.193 0.394 
Highest educational degree: Vocational training (dummy) 0.697 0.459 
Children (dummy) 0.341 0.474 
East Germany (dummy) 0.239 0.426 
Married  (dummy) 0.618 0.486 
Net monthly household income minus own income (€) 1135.600 1005.472 
White collar low-skilled (dummy) 0.074 0.263 
White collar medium-skilled (dummy) 0.267 0.443 
White collar high-skilled (dummy) 0.208 0.406 
Blue collar low-skilled  (dummy) 0.161 0.367 
Blue collar medium-skilled or high-skilled (dummy) 0.289 0.453 
Obs 16140  
                            Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009, own calculations.  
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Table A2: Mulitnomial Logit, full sample 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.148** (0.071) 
0.068 
(0.137) 
-0.046 
(0.081) 
0.017 
(0.152) 
Kids  -0.069 (0.074) 
0.024 
(0.127) 
0.129 
(0.102) 
-0.169 
(0.184) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.311*** (0.111) 
0.250 
(0.199) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 1.077*** (0.137) 
-2.640*** 
(0.181) 
1.082*** 
(0.137) 
-2.652*** 
(0.180) 
female 0.426*** (0.080) 
-0.645*** 
(0.145) 
0.431*** 
(0.080) 
-0.653*** 
(0.146) 
Female x Kids  -0.221* (0.133) 
-0.312 
(0.250) 
-0.246* 
(0.133) 
-0.269 
(0.249) 
Married -0.032 (0.073) 
-0.154 
(0.129) 
-0.030 
(0.073) 
-0.152 
(0.129) 
University degree 0.523*** (0.177) 
0.353 
(0.306) 
0.526*** 
(0.177) 
0.359 
(0.306) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.268** (0.130) 
0.367* 
(0.215) 
0.271** 
(0.130) 
0.404* 
(0.216) 
Tenure x 10-2 -0.388 (0.821) 
1.953 
(1.313) 
-0.417 
(0.819) 
2.002 
(1.320) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -2.631** (1.095) 
-0.953 
(1.857) 
-2.611** 
(1.093) 
-0.992 
(1.870) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 -0.517 (0.860) 
-1.994 
(1.369) 
-0.530 
(0.857) 
-2.035 
(1.380) 
Hourly wage 0.058*** (0.006) 
-0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.058*** 
(0.006) 
-0.043* 
(0.010) 
Age 0.079*** (0.023) 
0.078** 
(0.038) 
0.080*** 
(0.023) 
0.077** 
(0.038) 
Age2 -0.001*** (0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) 0.339*** (0.112) 
0.149 
(0.194) 
0.337*** 
(0.112) 
0.152 
(0.194) 
White collar (middle) 0.574*** (0.092) 
0.361*** 
(0.149) 
0.569*** 
(0.092) 
0.400*** 
(0.150) 
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Table A2: Mulitnomial Logit, full sample (cont.) 
White collar (high) 0.851*** (0.115) 
0.119 
(0.208) 
0.849*** 
(0.115) 
0.120 
(0.209) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.465*** (0.079) 
0.220* 
(0.130) 
0.463*** 
(0.080) 
0.221 
(0.131) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) 0.019 (0.018) 
-0.044 
(0.034) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
-0.043 
(0.034) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
0.080*** 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.053) 
0.081*** 
(0.028) 
0.181 
(0.053) 
East 0.441*** (0.076) 
0.028 
(0.136) 
0.439*** 
(0.078) 
0.032 
(0.136) 
No. of obs 16140 
Pseudo-R2 0.084 0.085 
   Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. Reference group for professional 
position: Blue collar (low).  
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009 own calculations. 
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Table A3: Mulitnomial Logit, women 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.264** (0.134) 
0.398 
(0.285) 
-0.174 
(0.141) 
0.330 
(0.294) 
Kids  -0.275** (0.122) 
-0.347 
(0.239) 
-0.026 
(0.170) 
-0.589 
(0.377) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.445** (0.227) 
0.373 
(0.443) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 0.650*** (0.223) 
-2.661*** 
(0.277) 
0.689*** 
(0.223) 
-2.703*** 
(0.279) 
Married -0.098 (0.141) 
-0.261 
(0.291) 
-0.184 
(0.142) 
-0.248 
(0.289) 
University degree 0.250 (0.327) 
0.183 
(0.564) 
0.230 
(0.328) 
0.228 
(0.567) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.413 (0.253) 
0.557 
(0.357) 
0.410 
(0.255) 
0.596* 
(0.356) 
Tenure x 10-2 0.770 (1.724) 
3.186 
(2.294) 
0.749 
(1.743) 
3.305 
(2.289) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -3.192 (2.171) 
-4.920 
(3.415) 
-3.022 
(2.189) 
-5.029 
(3.428) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 -2.726 (1.794) 
-7.138*** 
(2.497) 
-2.862 
(1.825) 
-7.259*** 
(2.512) 
Hourly wage 0.066*** (0.012) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
0.066*** 
(0.012) 
-0.049** 
(0.023) 
Age 0.106*** (0.040) 
0.030 
(0.063) 
0.108*** 
(0.040) 
0.030 
(0.063) 
Age2 -0.001*** (0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
White collar (low) 0.574*** (0.175) 
0.256 
(0.329) 
0.573*** 
(0.175) 
0.262 
(0.328) 
White collar (middle) 0.867*** (0.189) 
0.640** 
(0.298) 
0.868*** 
(0.159) 
0.644** 
(0.298) 
White collar (high) 1.321*** (0.246) 
0.446 
(0.592) 
1.323*** 
(0.246) 
0.448 
(0.506) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.771*** (0.221) 
0.667 
(0.435) 
0.774*** 
(0.221) 
0.659 
(0.434) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.003 (0.032) 
-0.157** 
(0.065) 
0.000 
(0.032) 
-0.156** 
(0.065) 
Household income minus own 
income x 10-1  
0.112** 
(0.050) 
0.028 
(0.110) 
0.111** 
(0.050) 
0.032 
(0.110) 
East 0.322*** (0.139) 
0.425* 
(0.239) 
0.309** 
(0.138) 
0.426* 
(0.238) 
No. of obs 4948 
Pseudo-R2 0.099 0.100 
                  Notes: See Table A3.  
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Table A4: Mulitnomial Logit, men 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Over-
employed 
Under-
employed 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.098 (0.084) 
-0.043 
(0.156) 
0.009 
(0.099) 
-0.135 
(0.179) 
Kids  -0.061 (0.078) 
-0.024 
(0.130) 
0.114 
(0.113) 
-0.186 
(0.199) 
Works Council x Kids    -0.274** (0.130) 
0.243 
(0.224) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 1.132*** (0.173) 
-2.785*** 
(0.259) 
1.318*** 
(0.173) 
-2.790*** 
(0.259) 
Married 0.011 (0.088) 
-0.087 
(0.149) 
0.010 
(0.088) 
-0.086 
(0.149) 
University degree 0.723*** (0.200) 
0.512 
(0.362) 
0.728*** 
(0.200) 
0.511 
(0.367) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.210 (0.146) 
0.365 
(0.262) 
0.215 
(0.145) 
0.365 
(0.263) 
Tenure x 10-2 -1.004 (0.889) 
1.742 
(1.576) 
-1.032 
(0.881) 
1.765 
(1.587) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 -2.387* (1.250) 
-0.176 
(2.138) 
-2.405* 
(1.244) 
-0.194 
(2.154) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 0.463 (0.936) 
-1.046 
(1.630) 
0.449 
(0.928) 
-1.051 
(1.644) 
Hourly wage 0.057*** (0.007) 
-0.046*** 
(0.012) 
0.057*** 
(0.007) 
-0.046*** 
(0.012) 
Age 0.063** (0.028) 
0.107** 
(0.049) 
0.065** 
(0.028) 
0.106** 
(0.049) 
Age2 -0.001** (0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
White collar (low) 0.271* (0.155) 
0.178 
(0.264) 
0.264* 
(0.155) 
0.181 
(0.265) 
White collar (middle) 0.434*** (0.116) 
0.275 
(0.177) 
0.426*** 
(0.116) 
0.283 
(0.178) 
White collar (high) 0.649*** (0.130) 
-0.030 
(0.232) 
0.645*** 
(0.130) 
-0.029 
(0.232) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.396*** (0.088) 
0.152 
(0.140) 
0.392*** 
(0.088) 
0.155 
(0.141) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.028 (0.022) 
0.001 
(0.041) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
0.002 
(0.041) 
Household income minus own 
income x 10-1 
0.053 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.054 
(0.035) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
East 0.518*** (0.092) 
-0.067 
(0.165) 
0.519*** 
(0.093) 
-0.064 
(0.165) 
No. of obs 11192 
Pseudo-R2 0.085 0.086 
                 Notes: See Table A3. 
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Table A5: Probit with sample selection 
 Women Men 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. (Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council 0.125* (0.074) 
0.074 
(0.077) 
0.058 
(0.047) 
0.008 
(0.056) 
Kids  0.361*** (0.113) 
0.234** 
(0.126) 
0.022 
(0.039) 
-0.062 
(0.061) 
Works Council x Kids   0.245** (0.123)  
0.129* 
(0.073) 
Agreed working hours (week) x 10-1 -0.170 (0.116) 
-0.189 
(0.115) 
-0.445*** 
(0.093) 
-0.443*** 
(0.093) 
University degree -0.316 (0.211) 
-0.316 
(0.210) 
-0.475*** 
(0.118) 
-0.478*** 
(0.118) 
Completed apprenticeship -0.373** (0.161) 
-0.377** 
(0.161) 
-0.195** 
(0.089) 
-0.197** 
(0.089) 
Tenure x 10-2 -0.593 (0.965) 
-0.581 
(0.962) 
0.288 
(0.504) 
0.302 
(0.501) 
Uni. degree x tenure x 10-2 1.924 (1.203) 
1.822 
(1.207) 
1.405** 
(0.685) 
1.407** 
(0.683) 
Compl. apprent. x tenure x 10-2 1.904* (1.000) 
1.932* 
(1.005) 
-0.021 
(0.530) 
-0.016 
(0.526) 
Hourly wage -0.034*** (0.007) 
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
-0.028*** 
(0.004) 
Age -0.086*** (0.026) 
-0.089*** 
(0.026) 
-0.046*** 
(0.017) 
-0.047*** 
(0.017) 
Age2 0.001*** (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) -0.332*** (0.099) 
-0.329*** 
(0.099) 
-0.145 
(0.091) 
-0.141 
(0.091) 
White collar (middle) -0.506*** (0.090) 
-0.504*** 
(0.090) 
-0.234*** 
(0.065) 
-0.231*** 
(0.065) 
White collar (high) -0.737*** (0.133) 
-0.736*** 
(0.132) 
-0.349*** 
(0.073) 
-0.347*** 
(0.073) 
Blue collar (middle, high) -0.450*** (0.126) 
-0.448*** 
(0.126) 
-0.209*** 
(0.050) 
-0.208*** 
(0.050) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 -0.014 (0.020) 
-0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
0.034 
(0.050) 
0.040 
(0.050) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
0.004 
(0.033) 
East -0.160** (0.080) 
-0.152* 
(0.079) 
-0.242*** 
(0.057) 
-0.241*** 
(0.057) 
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Table A5: Probit with sample selection (cont.) 
Selection equation     
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 0.581*** (0.081) 
0.580*** 
(0.081) 
0.715*** 
(0.071) 
0.715*** 
(0.071) 
(Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 )2 -0.061*** (0.018) 
-0.061*** 
(0.018) 
-0.125*** 
(0.018) 
-0.125*** 
(0.018) 
Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 
-0.916*** 
(0.051) 
-0.961*** 
(0.051) 
-0.940*** 
(0.049) 
-0.939*** 
(0.049) 
(Household income minus own income 
x 10-1 )2 
0.118*** 
(0.007) 
0.118*** 
(0.007) 
0.126*** 
(0.008) 
0.126*** 
(0.008) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 
Household income x 10-3 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
Married 0.853*** (0.155) 
0.853*** 
(0.155) 
1.536*** 
(0.133) 
1.536*** 
(0.133) 
University degree 1.152*** (0.119) 
1.152*** 
(0.119) 
1.427*** 
(0.119) 
1.427*** 
(0.119) 
Completed apprenticeship 1.007*** (0.092) 
1.007*** 
(0.092) 
1.112*** 
(0.083) 
1.112*** 
(0.083) 
Married  x University degree -0.121 (0.170) 
-0.123 
(0.170) 
-0.352** 
(0.170) 
-0.352** 
(0.170) 
Married x  
Completed apprenticeship 
-0.589*** 
(0.129) 
-0.589*** 
(0.129) 
-0.487*** 
(0.116) 
-0.487*** 
(0.116) 
Married x  
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 
-0.086*** 
(0.028) 
-0.086*** 
(0.028) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
-0.005 
(0.031) 
Married x Household income minus 
own income x 10-3 
-0.185*** 
(0.050) 
-0.185*** 
(0.050) 
-0.395*** 
(0.050) 
-0.395*** 
(0.050) 
Age 0.205*** (0.018) 
0.205*** 
(0.018) 
0.110*** 
(0.018) 
0.110*** 
(0.018) 
Age2 -0.003*** (0.000) 
-0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Kids  -1.134*** (0.094) 
-1.134*** 
(0.094) 
-0.040 
(0.092) 
-0.040 
(0.092) 
Married x Kids  -0.419*** (0.105) 
-0.418*** 
(0.105) 
-0.187* 
(0.111) 
-0.187* 
(0.111) 
East -0.440*** (0.072) 
-0.440*** 
(0.072) 
-0.580*** 
(0.065) 
-0.580*** 
(0.065) 
Kids x East 0.671*** (0.111) 
0.673*** 
(0.111) 
-0.032 
(0.099) 
-0.031 
(0.099) 
Number of obs           15237 15237 16522 16522 
Censored obs        10289 10289 5330 5330 
Uncensored obs      4948 4948 11192 11192 
Rho (Std.) -0.255** (0.119) 
-0.271** 
(0.117) 
-0.124 
(0.094) 
-0.127 
(0.093) 
             Notes: See Table A3. 
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Table A6: Determinants of preferred working hours (pooled OLS) 
 
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.013 (0.127) 
-0.130 
(0.144) 
Kids  0.091 (0.120) 
-0.139 
(0.162) 
Works Council x Kids  
0.357** 
(0.180) 
Female -1.402*** (0.169) 
-1.404*** 
(-0.169) 
Female x Kids -0.283 (0.262) 
-0.249 
(0.263) 
Agreed working hours (week)  0.407*** (0.024) 
0.407 
(0.024) 
Married 0.227 (0.142) 
0.227 
(0.142) 
Female x Married -0.803*** (0.234) 
-0.812*** 
(0.234) 
University degree -0.553* (0.285) 
-0.556* 
(0.285) 
Completed apprenticeship -0.164 (0.213) 
-0.166 
(0.213) 
Tenure -0.032** (0.015) 
-0.032** 
(0.015) 
Uni. degree x tenure  0.046** (0.020) 
0.046** 
(0.020) 
Completed apprenticeship x tenure  0.029* (0.016) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
Hourly wage 0.029*** (0.009) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Age -0.112*** (0.039) 
-0.113*** 
(0.039) 
Age2 0.001** (0.000) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) -0.467** (0.182) 
-0.462** 
(0.182) 
White collar (middle) -0.642*** (0.162) 
-0.635*** 
(0.162) 
White collar (high) -0.324 (0.201) 
-0.317 
(0.200) 
Blue collar (middle, high) -0.353*** (0.123) 
-0.349*** 
(0.123) 
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Table A6: Determinants of preferred working hours (pooled OLS) (cont.) 
Agreed weekly hours (spouse) x 10-2 -0.100*** (0.031) 
-0.098*** 
(0.031) 
Household income minus own income x 10-1 -0.248*** (0.050) 
-0.249*** 
(0.050) 
East 0.521*** (0.124) 
0.524*** 
(0.124) 
No. of obs 
R² 
16140 
0.143 
16140 
0.144 
   Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. 
Reference group for professional position: Blue collar (low).  
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009 own calculations. 
 
 
Table A7: Incidence of overtime (Probit) 
 
Model 1 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Model 2 
Coeff. 
(Std.) 
Works Council -0.126 (0.081) 
-0.059 
(0.094) 
Kids  1.545 (1.068) 
2.132* 
(1.137) 
Works Council x Kids  -0.196 (0.137) 
Female 0.023 (0.115) 
0.024 
(0.115) 
Female x Kids -0.191 (0.157) 
-0.213 
(0.158) 
Agreed working hours (week)  -0.024 (0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
Agreed working hours (week) x Kids -0.046* (0.027) 
-0.058** 
(0.029) 
Married 0.196** (0.099) 
0.193* 
(0.099) 
Female x Married -0.631*** (0.149) 
-0.625*** 
(0.149) 
University degree 0.412** (0.204) 
0.414** 
(0.204) 
Completed apprenticeship 0.333** (0.134) 
0.334** 
(0.135) 
Tenure -0.020** (0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
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Table A7: Incidence of overtime (Probit) (cont.) 
Uni. degree x tenure  0.023* (0.014) 
0.024* 
(0.014) 
Completed apprenticeship x tenure  0.013 (0.009) 
0.013 
(0.009) 
Age 0.103*** (0.026) 
0.104*** 
(0.026) 
Age2 -0.001** (0.000) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
White collar (low) 0.188 (0.116) 
0.187 
(0.116) 
White collar (middle) 1.005*** (0.101) 
1.002*** 
(0.101) 
White collar (high) 1.964*** (0.136) 
1.962*** 
(0.136) 
Blue collar (middle, high) 0.662*** (0.086) 
0.660*** 
(0.086) 
East 0.601*** (0.096) 
0.637*** 
(0.096) 
No. of obs 
Pseudo R² 
16134 
0.106 
16134 
0.107 
 
Notes: ***/**/* indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Industry, time and establishment size dummies included. 
Reference group for professional position: Blue collar (low).  
Source: SOEP waves 2001-2009 own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
